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Abstract
This paper presents a new solution concept for multiplayer stochas-
tic games, namely, acceptable strategy profiles. For each player i and
state s in a stochastic game, let wi(s) be a real number. A strategy
profile is w-acceptable, where w = (wi(s)), if the discounted payoff to
each player i at every initial state s is at least wi(s), provided the
discount factor of the players is sufficiently close to 1. Our goal is
to provide simple strategy profiles that are w-acceptable for payoff
vectors w in which all coordinates are high.
Keywords: Stochastic games, acceptable strategy profiles, automata.
1 Introduction
Shapley (1953) presented the model of stochastic games, which are dynamic
games in which the state variable changes from stage to stage as a function
of the current state and the actions taken by the players. Shapley (1953)
proved that the discounted value exists in two-player zero-sum stochastic
games, and provided an equation that the discounted value satisfies.
This seminal work led to an extensive research in several directions (see
the surveys by, e.g., Neyman and Sorin (2003), Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir
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(2015), Solan and Vieille (2015), Jas´kiewicz and Nowak (2016a, 2016b), and
Solan and Ziliotto (2016)), including the study of the discounted value in
games with general state and action sets, the study of discounted equilibria
in multiplayer stochastic games, and the study of the robustness of equilibria.
A commonly studied robustness concept is that of uniform equilibrium.
A strategy profile is a uniform ε-equilibrium for ε ≥ 0 if it is an ε-equilibrium
in the discounted game, provided the discount factor is sufficiently close to
1. Thus, a strategy profile is a uniform ε-equilibrium if it is an approximate
equilibrium, provided the players are sufficiently patient.
Progress in the study of the uniform equilibrium turned out to be slow,
existence of such a strategy profile was proven only in special cases (see, e.g.,
Mertens and Neyman (1981), Solan (1999), Vieille (2000a, 2000b), Solan
and Vieille (2001), Simon (2007, 2012, 2016), Flesch, Thuijsman, and Vrieze
(2007), and Flesch, Schoenmakers, and Vrieze (2008, 2009)), and the strategy
profiles that are uniform ε-equilibrium are usually quite complex.
Players do not always adopt complex strategies. Herbert Simon, one
of the founding fathers of decision-making under uncertainty, believed that
human behavior follows simple rules and coined the term bounded rationality.
Warren Buffett, the American business magnate, is quoted as saying that
“The business schools reward difficult complex behavior more than simple
behavior, but simple behavior is more effective.” When Jack Welsh, retired
CEO of General Electric, was asked “what makes an effective organization?”,
he replied that “for a large organization to be effective, it must be simple.”
The present paper proposes a new solution concept for stochastic games
that combines simplicity in behavior with relatively high payoffs. Let w =
(wi(s)) be a vector, where i ranges over all players and s ranges over all states.
A strategy profile in a stochastic game is w-acceptable if when the players
follow it, for every discount factor sufficiently close to 1, the discounted payoff
of each player i is at least wi(s) when the initial state is s. Thus, when the
players follow such a strategy profile, they forgo the option to profit by
deviation in order to guarantee a reasonable high payoff for each player. A
strategy profile is min-max ε-acceptable if it is w-acceptable for the vector
w = (wi(s)) that is defined by wi(s) := v
1
i (s)− ε, where v
1
i (s) is the uniform
min-max value of player i at the initial state s. By Neyman (2003), v1i (s)
is the amount that player i can uniformly guarantee when the other players
cooperate to lower his payoff. Accordingly, a min-max ε-acceptable strategy
profile guarantees (up to ε) to each player an amount that is at least what
the player could have obtained in the worst case, provided he is sufficiently
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patient.
In their study of correlated equilibrium, Solan and Vieille (2002) con-
structed a min-max ε-acceptable strategy profile in every multiplayer stochas-
tic game for every ε > 0. Their construction uses the technique of Mertens
and Neyman (1981) for designing an optimal strategy in two-player zero-sum
stochastic games, and in particular is history dependent.
Our goal in this paper is the construction of simple strategy profiles that
are min-max ε-acceptable, where simplicity is measured by the size of the
automata that are neded to implement the strategies of the players.
A na¨ıve suggestion for a stationary min-max ε-acceptable strategy profile
is a stationary discounted equilibrium, for some discount factor sufficiently
close to 1. As we now explain, this approach is bound to fail. The discounted
payoff that corresponds to a stationary strategy profile is the weighted aver-
age of the payoffs that are received in the various states, where the weight of
a state is equal to the discounted time that the play spends in that state. A
discounted equilibrium yields a high discounted payoff to all players, which
implies that this weighted average is high. It might happen that while the
average payoff of all players is high, some players get high payoff in some
states, while other players get high payoff in other states. When we fix a
λ-discounted equilibrium and we calculate the payoff according to a discount
factor λ′ that goes to 1, the weights of the various states change, and there
is no guarantee that the weighted average payoff of all players remains high.
This phenomenon in fact happens, as can be seen in Example 2.5 below.
We prove the existence of a min-max ε-acceptable strategy profile, in
which the strategy of each player can be implemented by an automaton
whose number of states is at most the number of states in the stochastic
game times the number of players. The proof is constructive and identifies
(at least) one such strategy profile.
Another view on the concept of w-acceptability stems from the folk the-
orem. The folk theorem for repeated games states that under proper tech-
nical conditions, every feasible and individually rational payoff vector is an
equilibrium payoff. Solan (2001) extended this result for stochastic games
when cosidering etensive-form correlated equilibria rather than Nash equilib-
ria. The identification of the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs
in multiplayer stochastic games is open. A strategy profile is min-max ε-
acceptable if it generates a feasible and ε-individually rational payoff vector.
Thus, our work identifies simple strategy profiles that support ε-individually
rational payoff vectors.
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Identifying individually rational strategy profiles in the discrete-time game
is useful for continuous-time stochastic games. Indeed, an ε-individually ra-
tional strategy profile in the discrete-time game can be transformed into an
ε-equilibrium in the continuous-time game, see Neyman (2012).
The paper is organized as follows. The model of stochastic games, the
concept of acceptable strategy profiles, the main result, a discussion, and
open problems appear in Section 2. The proof of the main result appears in
Section 3
2 Model and Main Results
2.1 The Model of Stochastic Games
A multiplayer stochastic game is a vector Γ = (I, S, (Ai)i∈I , (ui)i∈I , q) where
• I = {1, 2, . . . , |I|} is a finite set of players.
• S is a finite set of states.
• Ai is a finite set of actions available to player i at each state.
1 Denote
by A := ×i∈IAi the set of all action profiles.
• ui : S × A → R is player i’s payoff function. We assume w.l.o.g. that
the payoffs are bounded between -1 and 1.
• q : S × A → ∆(S) is a transition function, where ∆(X) is the set of
probability distributions over X , for every nonempty finite set X .
The game is played as follows. The initial state s1 ∈ S is given. At
each stage n ∈ N, the current state sn is announced to the players. Each
player i chooses an action ani ∈ Ai; the action profile a
n = (ani )i∈N is publicly
announced, sn+1 is drawn according to q(· | sn, an) and the game proceeds
to stage n+ 1.
A correlated mixed action is an element of ∆(A). We extend the domain
of q and (ui)i∈I to correlated mixed actions in a multilinear fashion: for every
1We could have assumed that the action set of a player depends on the current state.
This would have complicated the definition of an automaton that implements a strategy,
hence we prefer to assume that the action set is independent of the state.
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state s ∈ S and every correlated mixed action α ∈ ∆(A) we define
q(s, α) :=
∑
a∈A
α[a]q(s, a), (1)
and
ui(s, α) :=
∑
a∈A
α[a]ui(s, a), ∀i ∈ I. (2)
LetH := ∪n∈N ((S × A)
n−1 × S) be the set of finite histories2 andH∞ :=
(S × A)∞ be the set of plays. We assume perfect recall. Accordingly, a
(behavior) strategy of player i is a function σi : H → ∆(Ai). A strategy
σi of player i is pure if for every finite history h
n ∈ H , the support of the
mixed action σi(h
n) contains one action. We note that the superscript n of
a history hn always denotes its length, and the last state of a finite history
hn is always denoted by sn. Denote by Σi the set of all strategies of player i,
by Σ := ×i∈IΣi the set of all strategy profiles, and by Σ−i := ×j 6=iΣj the set
of all strategy profiles of all players except player i.
A correlated strategy is a function τ : H → ∆(A). The set of all correlated
strategies is denoted Σcorr. We note that every strategy profile is in particular
a correlated strategy.
A class of simple strategies is the class of stationary strategies. Those are
strategies in which the choice of the player at each stage depends only on the
current state, and not on previously visited states or on past choices of the
players. A stationary strategy of player i can be identified with an element
of (∆(Ai))
S ⊂ R|S|×|Ai|, and will be denoted xi = (xi(s))s∈S. A strategy
profile σ = (σi)i∈I is stationary if for every player i ∈ I the strategy σi is
stationary. The set of all stationary strategy profiles is denoted Σstat and
the set of all stationary pure strategy profiles, that is, strategy profiles that
are composed of pure stationary strategies, is denoted Σstatpure. A stationary
correlated strategy is identified with an element of (∆(A))S. The set of all
stationary correlated strategies is denoted Σstatcorr.
We will endow H∞ with the σ-algebra generated by finite cylinders, and
denote by Hn the algebra generated by all finite histories of length n. This
algebra represents the information that the players possess at stage n. Every
initial state s1 ∈ S and every correlated strategy τ ∈ Σcorr induce a proba-
bility distribution Ps1,τ over the set of plays H
∞. Denote the corresponding
expectation operator by Es1,τ .
2By convention, the set (S ×A)0 contains only the empty history.
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2.2 Acceptable Strategy Profiles
For every initial state s1 ∈ S, every correlated strategy τ ∈ Σcorr, every
player i ∈ I, and every discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1) the λ-discounted payoff of
player i is
γλi (s
1; τ) := Es1,τ
[
(1− λ)
∞∑
n=1
λn−1ui(s
n, an)
]
.
The main concept that we study in this paper is the concept of acceptable
strategy profiles.
Definition 2.1 Let w ∈ RS×I. A strategy profile σ is w-acceptable at the
initial state s1 if there exists a real number λ0 ∈ [0, 1) such that for every
player i ∈ I and every λ ∈ [λ0, 1),
γλi (s
1, σ) ≥ wi(s
1), ∀i ∈ I. (3)
The strategy profile is w-acceptable if it is w-acceptable at all initial states.
In this case we say that the vector w is acceptable.
In words, a strategy profile σ is w-acceptable if whenever the players are
sufficiently patient it yields each player i at least wi(s
1), for every initial
state s1.
A natural question that arises is which vectors w are acceptable. A vector
w is a uniform equilibrium payoff 3 if for every ε > 0 there exists a real
number λ0 ∈ [0, 1) and a strategy profile σ
ε such that for every initial state
s1 ∈ S, every player i ∈ I, and every discount factor λ ∈ [λ0, 1) we have
|γλi (s
1; σε)− wi(s
1)| < ε and
γλi (s
1; σi, σ
ε
−i)− ε ≤ γ
λ
i (s
1; σε), ∀σi ∈ Σi.
If w is a uniform equilibrium payoff, then for every ε > 0 the vector w −
ε := (wi(s)− ε)i∈I,s∈S is acceptable. To date it is not known whether every
multiplayer stochastic game admits a uniform equilibrium payoff.
The λ-discounted min-max value of player i at the initial state s1 is given
by
vλi (s
1) := min
σ−i∈Σ−i
max
σi∈Σi
γλi (s
1; σi, σ−i). (4)
3The concept that we define here refers to uniformity in the discount factor only. A
stronger notion is defined in Mertens and Neyman (1981). We refer to this stronger notion
in Section 2.7 below.
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The interpretation of the min-max value is that the other players can ensure
that player i’s payoff will not be above his min-max value, and they cannot
lower his payoff further. Because for every fixed discount factor λ ∈ [0, 1) the
λ-discounted payoff is a continuous function of the strategies of the players,
the maxima and minimum in (4) are attained. It is well known (see Neyman,
2003) that the limit
v1i (s
1) := lim
λ→1
vλi (s
1)
exists for every player i ∈ I and every initial state s1 ∈ S. The quantity
v1i (s) is called the uniform min-max value of player i at state s.
For every ε > 0, every initial state s1 ∈ S, and every strategy profile σ−i
of the other players, there exists λ0 ∈ [0, 1) and a strategy σ
ε
i of player i such
that
γλi (s
1, σεi , σ−i) ≥ v
1
i (s
1)− ε, ∀λ ∈ [λ0, 1).
It is therefore natural to ask whether there are strategy profiles that ensure
that all players receive at least their uniform min-max values.
Definition 2.2 Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy profile σ is min-max ε-acceptable if
for every player i ∈ I, every initial state s1 ∈ S, and every discount factor λ
sufficiently close to 1, we have γλi (s
1, σ) ≥ v1i (s
1)− ε.
Since each player i can get at least v1i (s
1)− ε, provided he is sufficiently
patient, such a strategy profile guarantees for all players the minimal amount
that they would agree to receive in an equilibrium.
A by-product of the study of Solan and Vieille (2002) on extensive-form
correlated equilibria in stochastic games is that there always exists a min-
max ε-acceptable strategy profile. The construction of Solan and Vieille
(2002) uses the technique of Mertens and Neyman (1981), and the acceptable
strategy profiles are complex and history dependent. In this paper we ask
whether there are simple min-max ε-acceptable strategy profile.
We first identify two classes of stochastic games, namely, Markov decision
processes and absorbing games, in which there are stationary min-max ε-
acceptable strategy profiles. We do not know whether stationary min-max
ε-acceptable strategy profiles exist in every multiplayer stochastic game.
Blackwell (1962) proved that in stochastic games with a single player
(|I| = 1) there is a pure stationary strategy σ1 and λ0 ∈ [0, 1) that satisfy
γλi (s
1, σ1) ≥ v
1
i (s
1)− ε, ∀λ ∈ [λ0, 1), ∀s
1 ∈ S.
7
It follows that for every stochastic game with a single player there is a pure
and stationary min-max ε-acceptable strategy, for every ε > 0.
A state s ∈ S is absorbing if q(s | s, a) = 1 for every action profile a ∈ A.
An absorbing game is a stochastic game with a single nonabsorbing state.
By Solan (1999, Theorem 4.5) it follows that for every absorbing game there
is a stationary min-max ε-acceptable strategy profile, for every ε > 0.
2.3 Automata and Strategies Implemented by Automata
A common way to model a decision maker with bounded computational
capacity is by an automaton, which is a finite state machine whose output
depends on its current state, and whose evolution depends on the current
state and on its input (see, e.g., Neyman (1985) and Rubinstein (1986)).
Formally, an automaton is given by (1) a finite state space Q, (2) a finite
set In of inputs, (3) a finite set Out of outputs, (4) an output function
f : Q→ Out, (5) a transition function g : Q× In→ ∆(Q), and (6) an initial
state q∗ ∈ Q.
Denote by qn the automaton’s state at stage n. The automaton starts
in state q1 = q∗, and at every stage n ∈ N, as a function of the current
state qn and the current input in, the output of the automaton on = f(qn)
is determined, and the automaton moves to a new state qn+1 = g(qn, in).
The size of an automaton P is the number of states in Q. Below we will
use strategies that can be implemented by automata; in this case the size of
the automaton measures the complexity of the strategy.
Consider a stochastic game and fix a player i ∈ I. An automaton whose
set of inputs is the Cartesian product of the set of action profiles and the
set of states, and the set of outputs is the set of mixed actions of player i,
that is, In = A×S and Out = ∆(Ai), can implement a behavior strategy of
player i. Indeed, at every stage n, the strategy plays the mixed action f(qn),
and the new state of the automaton qn+1 = g(qn, an, sn+1) depends on its
current state qn, the action profile an played at stage n, and the new state
of the game sn+1.
Similarly, an automaton can implement a correlated strategy; In this case
the set of outputs of the automaton is the set of correlated mixed actions:
Out = ∆(A).
To distinguish between the state of the game and the state of the au-
tomaton we refer to the latter as automaton-states.
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2.4 The Main Result
We can now present our two main results. The first identifies an upper
bound to the size of the smallest automaton that implements a min-max
ε-acceptable strategy profile. In Section 3.11 we comment on the relation
between the min-max ε-acceptable strategy profile that we construct and
the study of extensive-form correlated equilibrium in stochastic games.
Theorem 2.3 For every stochastic game and every ε > 0 there exists a min-
max ε-acceptable strategy profile such that each of the strategies composing
the profile can be implemented by an automaton with size |S| × |I|.
Our second main result states that there exists a stationary min-max ε-
acceptable correlated strategy. Such a strategy can be implemented by an
automaton of size |S|.
Theorem 2.4 For every stochastic game and every ε > 0 there exists a
stationary min-max ε-acceptable correlated strategy.
The existence of an extensive-form correlated uniform equilibrium in
discrete-time stochastic games (Solan and Vieille, 2002) was used by Ney-
man (2012) to show the existence of a Nash uniform equilibrium in stochas-
tic games in continuous time. If the correlated strategy that underlies the
extensive-form correlated uniform equilibrium is stationary (rather than his-
tory dependent), the construction of Neyman (2012) becomes somewhat sim-
pler. Theorem 2.4 therefore simplifies the construction in Neyman (2012).
2.5 Discounted Equilibrium and Acceptable Strategy
Profiles
A strategy profile σλ is a λ-discounted equilibrium if for every initial state
s ∈ S and every player i ∈ I we have
γλ(s; σλ) ≥ γλ(s; σi, σ
λ
−i), ∀σi ∈ Σi.
It is well known (see Fink (1964) or Takahashi (1964)) that a λ-discounted
equilibrium in stationary strategies exists in every stochastic game, though
it usually depends on the discount factor. As the following example shows, a
strategy profile that is a λ-discounted equilibrium for a specific λ may yield
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some players low payoff when λ changes. This example shows in particular
that a λ-discounted equilibrium and a limit of λ-discounted equilibria as λ
goes to 1 need not be min-max ε-acceptable.
Example 2.5 Consider the two-player absorbing game that appear in Fig-
ure 1 and was studied by Sorin (1986). There are two absorbing states with
payoffs (0, 1) and (2, 0) respectively, and in the initial state s0, which is non-
absorbing, each player has two actions. In each entry of the matrix in the
figure, the stage payoff appears in the middle and the transition appears on
the top-right corner: s0 means that with probability 1 the play stays in state
s0, while ∗ means that with probability 1 the play continues to an absorbing
state, where the payoff vector is the vector written in the entry.
B
T
L R
0, 1 ∗
1, 0 s0
2, 0 ∗
0, 1 s0
state s0
Player 1
Player 2
Figure 1: The absorbing game in Example 2.5.
The uniform min-max value of Player 1 is 2
3
and the uniform min-max
value of Player 2 is 1
2
. In the unique equilibrium of this game Player 1 plays
x1(λ) = [
1
1+λ
(T ), λ
1+λ
(B)] and Player 2 plays x2(λ) = [
2
3
(L), 1
3
(R)]. The
limit of the equilibrium strategy profiles is for Player 1 to play T and for
Player 2 to play [2
3
(L), 1
3
(R)], which yields Player 2 a payoff of 1
3
, which is
lower than his uniform min-max value. Similarly, the equilibrium strategy
pair for a given discount factor x(λ) := (x1(λ), x2(λ)) may yield low payoff
for discount factors different than λ, because limλ′→1 γ
λ′
2 (x(λ)) =
1
3
.
2.6 Subgame Perfectness and ε-Individual Rationality
For every correlated strategy τ and every finite history hn = (s1, a1, · · · , sn) ∈
H define the strategy profile conditioned on hn, denoted by τhn, by
τhn(ĥ) = σ
ε(s1, a1, · · · , sn−1, an−1, ŝ1, â1, ŝ2, â2, · · · , ŝm), ∀ĥm = (ŝ1, â1, · · · , ŝm) ∈ H.
The notion of acceptability that we defined is not subgame perfect. That
is, even if σ is a min-max ε-acceptable strategy profile, there may be a finite
10
history hn ∈ H such that lim supλ→1 γ
λ
i (s
n, σhn) < v
1
i (s
n)− ε for some player
i ∈ I. We here present two stronger versions of acceptability that take care
of subgame perfectness.
Definition 2.6 Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy profile σ is subgame-perfect min-max
ε-acceptable if for every player i ∈ I, every finite history hn ∈ H, and every
discount factor λ sufficiently close to 1, we have γλi (s
1, σ | hn) ≥ v1i (s
1)− ε.
An even stronger concept of acceptability can be defined using the notion
of ε-individually rational strategy profiles, which originates from the study
of Solan (2001). For every state s ∈ S and every correlated action α(s) ∈
×i∈I∆(Ai) define
u∗i (s, α(s)) :=
∑
s′∈S
q(s′ | s, α(s))v1i (s
′).
This is the expected continuation uniform min-max value of player i at state
s when the players play the mixed action profile α(s).
Definition 2.7 Let ε ≥ 0. A correlated strategy τ is ε-individually rational
if for every finite history hn ∈ H, every player i ∈ I, and every action ai ∈ Ai
we have
u∗i (s
n, ai, τ−i(h
n)) ≤ lim
λ→1
γλi (s
n, τhn) + ε.
In words, a correlated strategy is ε-individually rational if when the players
are sufficiently patient, no player can profit more than ε by deviating after any
finite history, provided the deviation triggers a punishment at the uniform
min-max level.
Every ε-individually rational strategy profile that is min-max ε-acceptable
is also subgame-perfect min-max ε-acceptable. We now state stronger ver-
sions of Theorems 2.3 and 2.4.
Theorem 2.8 For every stochastic game and every ε > 0 there exists a min-
max ε-acceptable ε-individually rational strategy profile such that each of the
strategies composing the profile can be implemented by an automaton with
size |S| × |I|.
Our second main result states that there exists a stationary min-max
ε-acceptable ε-individually rational correlated strategy.
Theorem 2.9 For every stochastic game and every ε > 0 there exists a
stationary min-max ε-acceptable ε-individually rational correlated strategy.
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2.7 Finite Horizon Acceptability and Limit of the Av-
erages Acceptability
We defined the concept of acceptability using the discounted evaluation. One
could alternatively define this concept using finite horizon games or the in-
finite game. That is, for every state s1 ∈ S, every player i ∈ I, and every
k ∈ N the k-stage payoff is given by
γki (s
1; σ) := Es1,σ
[
1
k
k∑
n=1
ui(s
n, an)
]
, ∀σ ∈ Σ.
Let w ∈ RS×I , and call a strategy profile σ average w-acceptable if for every
k sufficiently large
γki (s, σ) ≥ wi(s
1), ∀i ∈ I, ∀s1 ∈ S. (5)
Call the strategy profile σ limit w-acceptable if
Es,σ
[
lim
k→∞
1
k
k∑
n=1
ui(s
n, an)
]
≥ wi(s
1), ∀i ∈ I, ∀s1 ∈ S. (6)
One could define a stronger concept of acceptability that is inspired by the
notion of uniform equilibrium: the strategy profile σ is uniform w-acceptable
if it is both discounted w-acceptable, average w-acceptable, and limit w-
acceptable. The implications of Blackwell (1962), Solan (1999), and Solan
and Vieille (2002) for acceptable strategy profiles are valid with the stronger
notion of uniform acceptability. Moreover, every strategy profile that can
be implemented by an automaton and is w-acceptable according to the dis-
counted, average, or limit notion, is uniform w-acceptable.
2.8 Open Problems
The introduction of the concept of acceptable strategy profiles raises several
open questions. These questions include the following:
• Whether there exists a stationary min-max ε-acceptable strategy pro-
files for every ε > 0. If the answer to the above question is negative,
then it will be interesting to know the size of the smallest automaton
that is needed to implement a min-max ε-acceptable strategy profile.
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• The characterization of the set of payoff vectors w for which there exists
stationary w-acceptable strategy profiles.
• More generally, one can study the set of payoff vectors w for which
there exists w-acceptable strategy profiles in some prespecified set of
simple strategy profiles, like the set of strategy profiles that can be
implemented by automata with at most K states.
• We allow the automata that are used in the construction of acceptable
strategy profiles to have random transitions and to choose mixed ac-
tions. It will be interesting to know the size of the minimal automaton
needed to implement acceptable strategy profiles when one require the
transitions of the automata, the function that selects the automata’s
actions, or both, to be deterministic.
3 Proof of the Main Results
We will start by proving Theorem 2.3. To this end we need to construct a
strategy profile that can be implemented by a small automaton and yields
the players a high payoff. As mentioned earlier, Solan and Vieille (2002)
constructed a history-dependent strategy profile that yield the players a high
payoff. Our proof technique is to transform the strategy profile of Solan
and Vieille (2002) into a simple strategy profile, without lowering the play-
ers payoffs. To this end we will define a concept of communicating sets of
states, and we will identify communicating sets of two types, A and B. In
communicating sets of type A, there is a strategy profile that yields to all
players a high payoff. In communicating sets of type B, there is a strategy
profile that ensures that the play leaves the set and the expected continu-
ation uniform min-max value is high. We will then show that the strategy
profiles mentioned above for both types of communicating sets can be chosen
to be simple, that is, they can be implemented by small automata. We will
finally show that under the strategy profile of Solan and Vieille (2002) all
communicating sets are of either type A or B, and with probability 1 the
play reaches a communicating set of type A, where the payoff is high.
In fact, the strategy profile that we will construct is subgame perfect in
the sense of Definition 2.6, hence we will also prove Theorem 2.8. We will
then explain how to modify the proof to obtain Theorems 2.4 and 2.9.
13
3.1 Irreducible Sets
Let x be a stationary strategy profile. A nonempty set D ⊆ S is closed under
x if under x the play never leaves D once it enters this set: q(D | s, x) = 1
for every state s ∈ D. A closed set is irreducible if it does not contain any
other closed set. Denote by I(x) the collection of all irreducible sets w.r.t. x.
For every irreducible set D ∈ I(x), the limit payoff under a stationary
strategy profile, limλ→1 γ
λ(s1, x), is independent of the initial state, as long
as the initial state is in D. Eq. (10) below provides a formula for the payoff
using the state-action frequency vector induced by x.
3.2 Auxiliary Normal-Form Games
Whenever x, y ∈ Rd we denote x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for every i = 1, 2, . . . , d, and
x = y if xi = yi for every i = 1, 2, . . . , d.
For every state s ∈ S let G(s) be the normal-form game with (i) player
set I, (ii) the action set of each player i is Ai, and (iii) the payoff function is
Ui(s; a) :=
∑
s′∈S
q(s′ | s, a)v1i (s
′), ∀i ∈ I, ∀a ∈ A.
This is the one-shot game played at state s in which the payoff of each player
is given by his expected uniform min-max value at tomorrow’s state.
For every state s ∈ S denote by E(s) the set of equilibria of the game
G(s), and let E = ×s∈SE(s) ⊆ (×i∈I∆(Ai))
S be the set of stationary strategy
profiles composed of equilibria of the games (G(s))s∈S. Note that for every
mixed action profile x(s) ∈ E(s) of G(s), the payoff to each player i ∈ I is
at least v1i (s):
v1(s) ≤ U(s; x(s)) =
∑
s′∈S
q(s′ | s, x(s))v1(s′), (7)
where Ui(s; x(s)) is the multilinear extension of Ui(s; ·) to ∆(A), for each
player i ∈ I.
A strategy profile σ is an ε-perturbation of E if after every history the
mixed action profile that is played is ε-close to some mixed action profile in
E(s), where s is the current state. Formally,
Definition 3.1 Let ε > 0. A strategy profile σ is an ε-perturbation of E if
for every finite history hn = (s1, a1, · · · , sn) ∈ H we have d∞(σ(h
n), E(sn)) <
ε, where d∞(x, Y ) := maxy∈Y ‖x − y‖∞ is the distance between the point x
and the set Y .
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3.3 Communicating Sets under E
For every set C ⊆ S denote by νC the first arrival time to C:
νC := min{n ∈ N : s
n ∈ C}.
By convention, the minimum of an empty set is +∞. For every set of states
C ⊆ S, the complement of C is denoted S \ C or Cc.
Definition 3.2 Let C ⊆ S be a set of states and let s, s′ ∈ C be two states
in C. We say that state s leads in C to state s′ if there is a strategy profile σ
such that when the initial state is s and the players follow σ, the play reaches
s′ before exiting C:
Ps,σ(ν{s′} < νCc) = 1.
Note that if state s leads in C to state s′, then there is a pure stationary
strategy that ensures that the play reaches s′ without leaving C (see also
Lemma 3.6 in Solan and Vieille, 2002). It follows that for every set of states
D ⊂ C there is a pure stationary strategy that ensures that the play reaches
D without leaving C, provided the initial state is in C \D. We denote such
a pure stationary strategy profile by yD;C.
In Section 3.1 we defined the concept of closedness under a stationary
strategy profile. We here extend this concept to closedness under a collection
of strategy profiles.
Definition 3.3 A set of states D ⊆ S is closed under E if for every state
s ∈ D and every x(s) ∈ E(s) we have
q(D | s, x(s)) = 1.
In other words, a set of states D is closed under E if under strategy profiles
that use mixed actions in E the play cannot leave D.
A set in a stochastic game is communicating if every state leads in the set
to any other state (see Ross and Varadarajan (1991) for the analog definition
in Markov decision problems or Solan and Vieille (2002)). We will need a
variation of this definition, which we present now.
Definition 3.4 A set of states C ⊆ S is communicating under E if the
following conditions hold:
(C.1) The set C is closed under E.
15
(C.2) For every two states s, s′ ∈ C, state s leads in C to state s′.
(C.3) v1(s) = v1(s′), for every two states s, s′ ∈ C.
When C is a communicating set under E we denote by v(C) the common
uniform min-max value of the states in C; that is, v(C) := v1(s) for any
s ∈ C.
The following lemma asserts that communicating sets exist. Moreover, it
provides a way to identify minimal communicating sets under E.
Lemma 3.5 There exists a communicating set under E.
Proof. Consider a Markov chain whose set of states is S, and whose
transition p satisfies the following property: there is a positive probability
to move from state s to state s′ if and only if there is a mixed action profile
x(s) ∈ E(s) such that q(s′ | s, x(s)) > 0. A set of states D is closed under p
if p(D | s) = 1 for every s ∈ D. Let D be a minimal closed set under p. By
definition, D is closed under E, so that Condition (C.1) holds. Moreover, for
every s, s′ ∈ D, state s leads in D to state s′, so that Condition (C.2) holds.
Since any state s ∈ D leads in D to any other state s′ ∈ D using mixed
action profiles in E, it follows by Eq. (7) that v1i (s) ≤ v
1
i (s
′) for every player
i ∈ I and every two states s, s′ ∈ D, and therefore Condition (C.3) holds as
well.
Denote by Cmax the collection of all maximal communicating sets under E.
Since the strategy profiles that lead in C from one state to any other state do
not necessarily use action profiles in E, There may be communicating sets
under E that strictly contain other communicating sets under E. Note that
any two maximal communicating sets under E are either disjoint or equal.
Denote by C∗ := ∪C∈CmaxC the union of all maximal communicating sets
under E.
The following standard result states that there is a stationary strategy
profile that uses only mixed action profiles in E, which ensures that the play
reaches a maximal communicating set under E.
Lemma 3.6 There is a stationary strategy profile x that satisfies the follow-
ing properties:
• x(s) ∈ E(s) for every s ∈ S.
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• For every state s 6∈ C∗ we have Ps,x(νC∗ <∞) = 1.
Proof. We will define the stationary strategy profile x only on S \ C∗.
Define inductively D0 := C∗ and for every k ≥ 1
Dk := Dk−1 ∪ {s ∈ S \Dk−1 : q(Dk−1 | s, x(s)) > 0 for some x(s) ∈ E(s)}.
For every s ∈ Dk \Dk−1 let x∗(s) be some mixed action profile in E(s) that
satisfies q(Dk−1 | s, x∗(s)) > 0. The sequence of sets (Dk)k∈N is nondecreas-
ing (w.r.t. set inclusion), hence there is a set D ⊆ S such that D = Dk for
every k ∈ N sufficiently large. If D = S then the stationary strategy profile
x∗ satisfies the desired properties. Otherwise, for every state s 6∈ D and
every x(s) ∈ E(s) we have q(Dc | s, x(s)) = 1, so that the proof of Lemma
3.5 implies that there exists a communicating set under E which is included
in Dc, a contradiction.
Lemma 3.6 leads us to the following definition of transient states under
E.
Definition 3.7 Every state s 6∈ C∗ is called a transient state under E.
In the sequel we will construct strategy profiles that satisfy various desir-
able properties. It will be convenient to define the strategy profiles separately
on each maximal communicating set C. We will therefore refer to strategy
profiles that are defined only for finite histories that remain in some set of
states C, that is, for finite histories h ∈ HC := ∪n∈N
(
(C × A)n−1 × C
)
.
3.4 State-Action Frequencies
The state-action frequency vector of a strategy profile at a given initial state
is the long-run average frequency in which each action profile is played at
each state.
Definition 3.8 Let τ be a correlated strategy. The state-action frequency
vector of τ at the initial state s1 ∈ S is the probability distribution ρs1,τ over
S ×A that is defined as follows:
ρs1,τ(s, a) := lim
N→∞
1
N
Es1,τ
[
N∑
n=1
1{sn=s,an=a}
]
, ∀(s, a) ∈ S ×A. (8)
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The state-action frequency vector is well defined only if the |S| × |A| limits
defined in Eq. (8) exist. The state frequency of state s under the correlated
strategy τ at the initial state s1 is
ρs1,τ(s) :=
∑
a∈A
ρs1,τ(s, a).
We will consider below only correlated strategies for which the state-
action frequency vector exists, hence issues of nonexistence of the state-action
frequency vector and of the state frequency vector will not arise.
The long-run average payoff of the correlated strategy τ at the initial
state s1 is
payoff(ρs1,τ ) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
ρs1,τ (s, a)u(s, a) ∈ R
I . (9)
Note that
payoff(ρs1,τ ) = lim
λ→1
γλ(s1, τ). (10)
Denote the set of all state-action frequency vectors of correlated strategies
by
Πcorr(s
1) := {ρs1,τ : τ ∈ Σcorr},
the set of all state-action frequency vectors of correlated stationary strategies
by
Πstatcorr(s
1) := {ρs1,τ : τ ∈ Σ
stat
corr},
and the set of all state-action frequency vector of pure stationary strategy
profiles by
Πstatpure(s
1) := {ρs1,x : x ∈ Σ
stat
pure}.
The following result, which states that the state-action frequency vector of a
correlated strategy is in the convex hull of the set of state-action frequency
vectors of correlated stationary strategies, follows from Altman and Gaits-
gory (1993), Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille (2004) or Mannor and Tsitsiklis
(2005).
Theorem 3.9 For every initial state s1 ∈ S we have Πcorr(s
1) = conv(Πstatcorr(s
1)).
18
We will need the following stronger version of Theorem 3.9, which states
that the state-action frequency vector of a correlated strategy is in the convex
hull of the set of state-action frequency vectors of pure stationary strategy
profiles.
Proposition 3.10 For every initial state s1 ∈ S we have Πcorr(s
1) = conv(Πstatpure(s
1)).
Proof. Since Σstatpure ⊆ Σ
stat
corr, in view of Theorem 3.9 it is sufficient to
show that that Πstatcorr(s
1) ⊆ conv(Πstatpure(s
1)). For every correlated stationary
strategy τ denote the number of states in which τ(s) is not pure by
dτ := #{s ∈ S : |supp(τ(s))| > 1}.
We will prove the claim by induction on dτ ; that is, we fix a correlated
stationary strategy τ for which the state-action frequency vector exists, and
prove that ρs1,τ is in the convex hull of the set of state-action frequency
vectors of correlated stationary strategies τ ′ satisfying dτ ′ = dτ − 1.
Fix a state s ∈ S such that |supp(τ(s))| > 1. For each action profile
a ∈ A, let τa be the correlated stationary strategy that plays a at s and
coincides with τ otherwise. Plainly dτa = dτ − 1 for every action profile
a ∈ A.
For every a ∈ A denote by ea the expected return time to s under τa:
ea := Es1,τa [min{n ≥ 2: s
n = s}].
Note that if there is a ∈ A such that ea = ∞, then the state frequency of
state s is 0.
If ea <∞ for every action profile a ∈ A, then
ρs1,τ =
∑
a∈A
τ(a | s)ea∑
a′∈A τ(a | s)ea′
ρs1,τa ,
where τ(a | s) is the probability that under τ the action profile a is played
at state s. Otherwise, denoting A′ := {a ∈ A : ea =∞}, we have
ρs1,τ =
∑
a∈A′
τ(a | s)∑
a′∈A′ τ(a | s)
ρs1,τa .
The result follows.
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For every set of states C ⊆ S, define
R(C) := conv
{
ρs1,x : x ∈ Σ
stat, s1 ∈ D for some D ∈ I(x)
}
.
This is the convex hull of all state-action frequency vectors, which are sup-
ported by irreducible sets that are subsets of C.
Let
∑L
l=1 β
(l)ρs(l),x(l) be a point inR(C), where L ∈ N, β ∈ ∆({1, 2, . . . , L},
and ρs(l),x(l) is the state-action frequency vector of the stationary strategy pro-
file x(l) whose support is the irreducible set D(l), for every l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}.
The payoff that corresponds to a point
∑L
l=1 β
(l)ρs(l),x(l) ∈ R(C) is
payoff
(
L∑
l=1
β(l)ρs(l),x(l)
)
:=
L∑
l=1
β(l)payoff(ρs(l),x(l)) ∈ R
I .
The following result states that every point in the set R(C) is dominated
by the payoff that corresponds to the state-action frequency of some strategy
profile that can be implemented by small automata.
Proposition 3.11 Let C be a communicating set under E. Suppose that
there exists a point
∑L
l=1 β
(l)ρs(l),x(l) ∈ R(C) and a vector c ∈ R
I that satisfy
payoff i
(
L∑
l=1
β(l)ρs(l),x(l)
)
≥ ci, ∀i ∈ I. (11)
Then for every ε > 0 there exists a strategy profile σ that is defined as long
as the play remains in C, can be implemented by automata with size |C|×|I|,
and that yields to each player i ∈ I a payoff at least ci − ε:
lim
λ→1
γλi (s, σ) ≥ ci − ε, ∀s ∈ C, ∀i ∈ N.
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. that β(l) > 0 for every l = 1, 2, . . . , L. Carathe´odory’s
Theorem implies that we can assume w.l.o.g. that L ≤ |I|. For every
l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L} let D(l) ⊆ C be the irreducible set under x(l) that con-
tains s(l). Roughly, the players will play the following for every l: they will
play the pure stationary strategy profile yD(l);C that leads the play to D
(l),
and at D(l) they will play the stationary strategy x(l). To ensure that the
play iterates between the implementation of (x(l))Ll=1, we define the transition
from the states that implement x(l) at D(l) as follows: with probability δ
β(l)
,
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where δ > 0 is sufficiently small, we increase the index l by 1, and the play-
ers start playing the pure stationary strategy profile yD(l+1);C until the play
reaches D(l+1); with the remaining probability the players continue following
x(l).
We now turn to the formal proof. For every δ ∈ (0,minl=1,2,··· ,L β
(l))
define the following strategy profile σδ, which is defined only for histories
that remain in C:
1. Set l = 1.
2. As long as the play is in C \D(l), the players follow the pure stationary
strategy profile yD(l);C that leads the play to the set D
(l).
3. Once the play is inD(l), the players play the mixed action profile x(l)(s),
where s is the current state. With probability δ
β(l)
the index l is in-
creased by 1 (modulo L) and we go to Step 2. With the remaining
probability we remain in Step 3.
The reader can verify that the strategy profile σδ can be implemented by
an automaton with size L × |I|. Moreover, the expected number of stages
the play remains in Step 3 is β
(l)
δ
. Hence,
lim
δ→0
ρs1,σδ =
L∑
l=1
β(l)ρs(l),x(l), ∀s
1 ∈ C.
Since the strategy profile σδ is implemented by an automaton,
lim
δ→0
lim
λ→1
γλ(s1, σδ) = payoff
(
L∑
l=1
β(l)ρs(l),x(l)
)
≥ c,
and the result follows.
Remark 3.12 In Proposition 3.11 we constructed a strategy profile that can
be implemented by automata of size |C| × |I| and that generates payoff at
least c. By Carathe´odory’s Theorem, the same proof allows one to construct
a strategy profile that generates payoff exactly c and that can be implemented
by automata of size |C| × (|I|+ 1).
21
3.5 A Result of Solan and Vieille (2002)
Solan and Vieille (2002) studied extensive-form correlated equilibria in mul-
tiplayer stochastic games, and constructed such an equilibrium using the
method of Mertens and Neyman (1981). In this section we present the part
of their result that we need in our construction.
Proposition 3.13 (Solan and Vieille, 2002) For every ε > 0 there exists
a strategy profile σ̂ε that satisfies the following properties for every finite
history hn = (s1, a1, · · · , sn) ∈ H and every player i ∈ I:
(SV.1) The strategy profile σ̂ε is an ε-perturbation of E.
(SV.2) The state-action frequency vector ρsn,σ̂ε
hn
is well defined.
(SV.3) For every bounded stopping time ν > n we have Es1,σ̂ε [v
1
i (s
ν) | hn] ≥
v1i (s
n)− ε.
(SV.4) payoffi(ρsn,σ̂εhn ) ≥ v
1
i (s
n)− ε for every player i ∈ I.
From now on we fix a sequence (σ̂ε)ε>0 of strategy profiles that satisfy
the conclusion of Proposition 3.13.
Remark 3.14 Solan and Vieille (2002) prove that Condition (SV.4) holds
only for the history h1 = (s1). However, this condition holds for every finite
history. Indeed, this condition holds as soon as the analogous condition for
zero-sum games holds in the set up of Mertens and Neyman (1981), and a
careful inspection of the proof of Mertens and Neyman (1981) shows that it
indeed holds.
We now identify two types of communicating sets under E. The type of
a set depends on the sequence (σ̂ε)ε>0 that we fixed. Roughly, the type of a
communicating set C under E is A if under σ̂ε with positive probability the
play never leaves C (after some finite history), and the type is B if under σ̂ε
the play is bound to leave C.
Definition 3.15 A communicating set C under E has type A (w.r.t. the
sequence (σ̂ε)ε>0) if there exists a finite history h
n = (s1, a1, · · · , sn) ∈ H
such that
lim sup
ε→0
Psn,σ̂ε(νCc =∞) > 0.
Otherwise the set has type B (w.r.t. the sequence (σ̂ε)ε>0).
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Remark 3.16 We could have weakened Definition 3.15 as follows. For our
purposes, we could have defined a communicating set C under E to have type
A if there is a sequence (εk)k∈N that converges to 0 and for every k there is
a finite history hn(k) ∈ H such that sn(k) ∈ C and Psn(k),σ̂εk
hn(k)
(νCc =∞) > 0.
We could also define a maximal communicating set C under E to have type
B if there is a sequence (εk)k∈N that converges to 0 and for every k there is
a finite history hn(k) ∈ H such that sn(k) ∈ C and limk→∞Psn(k),σ̂εk
hn(k)
(νCc =
∞) = 1.
In Section 3.6 we prove the existence of a simple strategy profile that
yields each player a high payoff in communicating sets of type A. In Section
3.8 we handle communicating sets of type B.
3.6 Communicating Sets of Type A
The following result, together with Proposition 3.11, implies that if C is
a maximal communicating set under E of type A, then there is a simple
ε-acceptable min-max strategy profile when the initial state is in C.
Proposition 3.17 Let ε > 0, let hn = (s1, a1, · · · , sn) ∈ H be a finite
history, and suppose that sn belongs to some maximal communicating set
C ∈ Cmax. If
Phn,σ̂ε(νCc =∞) > 0,
then there exists a point
∑L
l=1 β
(l)ρs(l),x(l) ∈ R(C) such that
payoff
(
L∑
l=1
β(l)ρs(l),x(l)
)
≥ v1(sn)− 2ε. (12)
Proof. By assumption,
Psn,σ̂ε
hn
(νCc =∞) > 0, (13)
and by Condition (SV.4),
payoff i(ρsn,σ̂εhn ) ≥ v
1
i (s
n)− ε, ∀i ∈ I. (14)
Eq. (13) implies that there are n′ ∈ N, a state s′ ∈ C, and an event A ∈ Hn
′
such that (a) Psn,σ̂ε
hn
(A) > 0, (b) sn
′
= s′ on A, and (c)
Psn,σ̂ε
hn
(νCc =∞ | A) > 1− ε. (15)
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Let τ be the correlated strategy that is defined as σ̂εhn conditional on the
event A. That is, τ is defined as follows: one first chooses an infinite play
h ∈ H∞ according to the conditional probability Ps1,σ̂ε
hn
(· | A), which, since
A is measurable w.r.t. Hn
′
, is equivalent to choosing a finite history hn
′
; and
then τ follows σ̂ε
hn′
. By Eq. (15) we have
Ps′,τ (νCc =∞) = Psn,σ̂ε
hn
(νCc =∞ | A) > 1− ε. (16)
By Condition (SV.2) the state-action frequency vector under τ exists, and
by Condition (SV.4) it satisfies
payoff i(ρs1,τ ) ≥ v
1
i (s
1)− ε, ∀i ∈ I. (17)
For every state s ∈ C denote by A(s) the set of all the actions a(s)
that keep the play in C, that is, A(s) := {a ∈ A : q(C | s, a) = 1}. By
Condition (SV.1), the strategy profile σ̂ε is an ε-perturbation of E, and
therefore σ(A(s) | h) > 0 for every finite history h ∈ H .
Let τ̂ be the correlated strategy that is equal to τ , except that we set to
0 the probability of action profiles that may lead the play outside C, and we
normalize the resulting measure; that is, for every ĥk = (ŝ1, â1, · · · , ŝk) ∈ H
and every action profile a ∈ A we set
τ̂(a | ĥk) :=
{
0 q(C | ŝk, a) < 1,
τ(a|ĥk)
τ(A(s)|ĥk)
q(C | ŝk, a) = 1).
By definition we have
Ps′,τ̂(νCc =∞) = 1. (18)
Condition (SV.2) and Eq. (16) imply that the state-action frequency vector
ρs1,τ̂ exists. Denote the minimal exit probability from C by
QC := min{q(C
c | s, a) : (s, a) ∈ E(C)} > 0. (19)
The probability that under τ we have an 6∈ A(sn) is at most ε
QC
, and therefore
by Eq. (17) and since payoffs are bounded by 1 we have
‖payoff(ρs1,τ̂ )− payoff(ρs1,τ)‖∞ <
2ε
QC
. (20)
The result follows by Propositions 3.10 and 3.11.
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3.7 Exits from a Communicating Set
We now present the notion of exit from a set of states, which is somewhat
different than existing definitions of exits in the literature (see, e.g., Solan
(1999), Vieille (2000a,b), and Solan and Vieille (2002)).
Definition 3.18 An exit from a set of states C is a pair (s, a) of a state
s ∈ C and an action profile a ∈ A such that, if at s the players play a, the
play leaves C with positive probability: q(C | s, a) < 1. The set of all exits
from a communicating set C is denoted E(C) ⊆ C × A.
Exits are used when players try to coordinate leaving a given set of states
C. In the literature, to exit a given set of states the players played a strategy
profile that is a perturbation of a given stationary strategy profile. In our
application the strategy profile that the players use is not a perturbation of
a single stationary strategy profile, hence we need a more general definition
of exits. In Section 3.11 we mention an alternative definition of an exit that
is closer in spirit to the definitions in the literature.
Denote by ν∗C the first time in which an exit from C is played:
ν∗C := min
{
n ∈ N : (sn, an) ∈ E(C)
}
.
Note that ν∗C ≤ νCc whenever the initial state is in C.
Let C ⊂ S be a set of states, let (s, a) ∈ E(C) be an exit from C, let
s1 ∈ C be the initial state, and let σ be a strategy profile. The probability
that the first exit that is played is (s, a) is
µ(s1, σ, C; s, a) := Ps1,τ
(
sν
∗
C = s, aν
∗
C = a
)
.
For every exit (s, a) ∈ E(C) and every sequence (σε)ε>0 of strategy profiles
denote by
µ(s1, (σε)ε>0, C; s, a) := lim
ε→0
µ(s1, σε, C; s, a) (21)
the limit probability that under (σ̂ε)ε>0 the first exit from C that is played
is (s, a). By taking a subsequence we will always assume that the (at most
|E(C)|) limits in Eq. (21) exist.
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3.8 Communicating Sets of Type B
Suppose that (s, a) is an exit from the communicating set E, and that there
is an action profile a′ that satisfies two properties: (a) it differs from a in the
action of a single player, and (b) it keeps the play in C. Then the players
can tune the rate in which the play exits C through (s, a) as follows: in
C \{s} the players play a stationary strategy that leads the play to s, and at
s they play the mixed action profile (1− η)a+ ηa′, for some η ∈ (0, 1]. This
procedure is useful when the players want to implement a certain probability
distribution over exits from C.
The following result states that if for every ε > 0 the strategy profile σε
is an ε-perturbation of E, and if the set of states C is communicating under
E, then for every exit (s, a) from C for which µ(s1, (σε)ε>0, C; s, a) > 0 we
can find an action profile a′ at s that differs from a in the action of a single
player and leads the game to stay in C.
Lemma 3.19 Let C be a communicating set under E, let s1 ∈ C, let (σε)ε>0
be a sequence of strategy profiles such that (a) the strategy profile σε is an
ε-perturbation of E for every ε > 0, and (b) the limit in Eq. (21) exists
for every exit (s, a) ∈ E(C), and let (s, a) ∈ E(C) be an exit with positive
probability: µ(s1, (σε)ε>0, C; s, a) > 0. There is an action profile a
′ ∈ A that
satisfies the following properties:
(W.1) q(C | s, a′) = 1: under a′ the play remains in C.
(W.2) The number of players i ∈ I for which ai 6= a
′
i is one.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there is an exit (s, a) ∈ E(C) for
which µ(s1, (σε)ε>0, C; s, a) > 0, and such that for every action a
′ ∈ A that
differ from a by the action of a single player we have q(C | s, a′) < 1. Denote
by A′(s) ⊂ A the set of all action profiles a′ ∈ A that differs from a by the
action of a single player. By the assumption, all action profiles in the set
A′(s) are part of exits from C.
Since σε is an ε-perturbation of E for every ε > 0, for every finite history
hn that ends at s we have σε(a | hn) < ε. Since σε(a | hn) =
∏
i∈I σ
ε
i (ai | h
n),
there is a player i = i(hn) such that
σεi (ai | h
n) < ε1/|I|.
Hence,
σεi (A \ {ai} | h
n)
σεi (ai | h
n)
≥
1− ε1/|I|
ε1/|I|
.
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This inequality holds for every ε > 0, and therefore µ(s1, (σε)ε>0, C; s, a) ≤
limε→0
σε
i
(ai|hn)
σε
i
(A\{ai}|hn)
= 0, a contradiction.
The next proposition provides a condition that ensures that we can con-
struct a simple strategy with a predetermined exit distribution from a com-
municating set.
Proposition 3.20 Let C be a communicating set under E, let s1 ∈ C, let
(σε)ε>0 be a sequence of strategy profiles such that (a) the strategy profile σ
ε
is an ε-perturbation of E for every ε > 0, and (b) the limit in Eq. (21) exists
for every exit (s, a) ∈ E(C), and let c ∈ RI. Suppose that there exist L ∈ N,
a probability distribution β ∈ ∆({1, 2, . . . , L}), and for every l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}
there exist an exit (s(l), a(l)) from C, a player i(l) ∈ I, and an action profile
a′(l) ∈ A, such that the following conditions hold:
(E.1) The expected uniform min-max value upon playing an exit is at least c:∑L
l=1 β
(l)u∗(s(l), a(l)) ≥ c.
(E.2) The pair (s(l), a′(l)) is not an exit from C, that is, q(C | s(l), a′(l)) = 1.
(E.3) The action pairs a(l) and a′(l) differ in the action of a single player:
a
(l)
i 6= a
′(l)
i if and only if i = i
(l).
Then there is a strategy profile σ that is defined as long as the play remains
in C and satisfies the following properties:
(F.1) The strategy profile σ can be implemented by automata with size |C| ×
|I|.
(F.2) For every initial state s1 ∈ C, under σ the play leaves C with probability
1, that is, Ps1,σ(νCc <∞) = 1.
(F.3) For every initial state s1 ∈ C, under σ the expected uniform min-max
value upon leaving C is at least c, that is, Es1,σ[v
1(sνCc ] ≥ c.
Proof. The idea of the proof is as follows. Carathe´odory’s Theorem
implies that we can assume w.l.o.g. that L ≤ |I|. For each l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}
we use |C| automaton-states to implement each of the stationary strategies
(x
(l)
i )i∈I , one for each state in C: in all automaton-states that correspond to
states in C \ {s(l)}, the players play a pure stationary strategy profile that
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ensures that the play reaches s(l). In the automaton-state that corresponds
to state s(l), each player i 6= i(l) plays a
(l)
i while player i
(l) plays (1−η(l))a
′(l)
i +
η(l)a(l), for a properly chosen η(l) ∈ (0, 1), thereby ensuring that with positive
probability the play leaves C. If at state s(l) the play does not leave C, then
the automaton moves to an automaton-state that implements x(l+1). The
probability η(l) to play a(l) is chosen so that the overall probability to exit C
through (s(l), a(l)) is β(l).
We now turn to the formal proof. For every η ∈ [0, 1] let z(l)(η) be the
mixed-action profile at s(l) defined by z(l)(η) := (1− η)a′(l)+ ηa(l). For every
collection of numbers in the unit interval ~η = (η(l))Ll=1 let σ(~η) be the strategy
profile that is defined as long as the play remains in C, as follows:
1. Set l = 1.
2. Play the stationary strategy profile y{s(l)};C until the play reaches the
state s(l).
3. At state s(l) play the mixed action profile z(l)(η(l)).
4. If the play remains in C, increase l by 1 and go to Step 2.
The strategy profile σ(~η) can be implemented by automata with size
L × |I|. As soon as
∑L
l=1 η
(l) > 0 and s1 ∈ C, the play leaves C with
probability 1, that is, Ps1,σ(~η)(νCc < ∞) = 1. Moreover, under σ(~η) with
probability 1 the play leaves C through one of the exits (s(l), a(l))Ll=1.
Let β(~η) ∈ ∆({1, 2, . . . , L}) be the probability distribution over the exits
{(s(l), a(l)), l = 1, 2, . . . , L} induced by σ(~η). We argue that there exists
~η∗ ∈ [0, 1]
I such that β(~η∗) = β. Indeed, fix η1 ∈ (0, 1) and η0 > 0 sufficiently
small, and consider the convex and compact set
X(η0, η1) :=
{
~η ∈ [0, η0]
I :
L∑
l=1
η(l) = η1, η
(l) ≥ η0 ∀l = 1, 2, . . . , L
}
.
Define a vector field ξ on X(η0, η1) by
ξ(~η) := β − β(~η).
One can verify that
∑L
l=1 ξ
(l)(~η) = 0 for every ~η ∈ X(η0, η1), and ξ
(l)(~η) > 0
whenever η(l) = η0, provided η0 is sufficiently small. By Brouwer’s Fixed
Point Theorem this implies that there is ~η∗ ∈ X(η0, η1) such that ξ(~η∗) = 0,
as claimed. Since β(~η∗) = β, the strategy profile σ(~η∗) satisfies the desired
properties.
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Proposition 3.21 Let C ∈ Cmax be a maximal communicating set of type
B. Then the conclusion of Proposition 3.20 holds.
Proof. Fix a finite history hn ∈ H for which sn ∈ C. Since the set
has type B, limε→0Psn,σ̂ε(νC = ∞) = 0. By taking a subsequence, we can
assume w.l.o.g. that the limit exit distribution µ(sn, (σ̂εhn)ε>0, C; s, a) exists.
By Lemma 3.19, for every exit (s, a) ∈ E(C) there is an action profile a′ that
satisfies Conditions (W.1) and (W.2). From Condition (SV.3), Conditions
(E.1)–(E.3) of Proposition 3.20 hold with β = µ(sn, (σ̂εhn)ε>0, C; s, a), and
the conclusion of the proposition holds as well.
3.9 The Construction of a Min-Max ε-Acceptable Strat-
egy Profile
We are now ready to define a min-max ε-acceptable strategy profile σ∗,ε. This
strategy profile will play stationarily in transient states under E. Moreover,
for every maximal communicating set C under E, whenever the play enters
C the strategy profile σ∗,ε will play in the same way. We therefore define
a sequence (kn)n∈N of stopping times that indicates when the play enters a
maximal communicating set or visits a transient state. That is, we will define
kn+1 to be the first stage after stage kn in which either (a) the state at stage
kn+1 is a transient state under E, or (b) the state at stage kn+1 belongs to
a maximal communicating set under E that does not contains the state at
stage kn. Formally, set
k1 := 1,
and for every n ≥ 1 set
kn+1 := min{m > n : s
m 6∈ C∗, or sm ∈ C ∈ Cmax and s
n 6∈ C}.
Note that if skn 6∈ C∗ then kn+1 = kn + 1.
Recall that σ̂ε is a strategy profile that satisfies the conclusion of Propo-
sition 3.13, for every ε > 0. Denote by x a stationary strategy profile that
satisfies Lemma 3.6; this strategy profile ensures that the play reaches a
communicating set.
We now turn to the formal definition of σ∗,ε. For every n ∈ N, define
• If skn 6∈ C∗, at stage n the strategy profile σ∗,ε coincides with x(skn),
that is, σ∗,ε(hkn) := x(skn).
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• Suppose that skn ∈ C ∈ Cmax and C is a maximal communicating set of
type A. By Propositions 3.17 there is a strategy profile σ(1) that satisfies
the conclusion of Proposition 3.11 with c = (ci)i∈I that is defined by
ci := vi(C)− ε for each player i ∈ I, provided the initial state is in C.
The conditional strategy profile σ∗,ε
hkn
coincides with the strategy profile
σ(1). Note that in this case the play under σ∗,ε
hkn
will never leave C, that
is, kn+1 =∞.
• Suppose that skn ∈ C ∈ Cmax and C is a maximal communicating
set of type B. By Proposition 3.21 there is a strategy profile σ(2) that
satisfies the conclusion of Proposition 3.20. The conditional strategy
profile σ∗,ε
hkn
coincides with the strategy profile σ(2) until an exit i splayed
for the first time. Note that in this case with probability 1 the play
under σ∗,ε
hkn
eventually leaves C.
Lemma 3.22 Under the strategy profile σ∗,ε, with probability 1 the play
reaches a maximal communicating set of type A.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that the claim does not hold. Since
under σ∗,ε the play reaches a maximal communicating set with probability
1, the assumption implies that there is a closed subset of transient states
and maximal communicating sets of type B. That is, there is a collection
{C1, C2, · · · , CL} of maximal communicating sets under E of type B and a
subset T ⊆ S \ C∗ of transient states, such that
• q
((
∪Ll=1Cl
)
∪ T | s, x(s)
)
= 1 for every state s ∈ T and every mixed
action profile x(s) ∈ E(s).
• For every l = 1, 2, . . . , L there exists a finite history hnl(l) ∈ H satis-
fying sn
l
(l) ∈ Cl, such that for every exit (s, a) ∈ E(C) that satisfies
µ(snl(l), (σ̂εhnl (l))ε>0, C; s, a) > 0 we have q
((
∪Ll=1Cl
)
∪ T | s, a
)
= 1.
This implies that either there exists a communicating set under E which is a
subset of T , or there exists a communicating set under E that strictly contains
one of the sets C1, C2, . . . , CL. The first alternative contradicts the fact that
C∗ contains all maximal communicating sets, while the second alternative
contradicts the fact that C1, · · · , CL are maximal communicating sets.
Define the stopping time N as the minimal integer n such that skn belongs
to a maximal communicating set of type A:
N := min{n ∈ N : skn ∈ C ∈ Cmax, C has type A}.
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The definition of the stationary strategy profile x and the definition of σ∗,ε on
maximal communicating sets of type B (see Proposition 3.21) imply that the
value process is a submartingale, that is, for every player i ∈ I, the sequence
(v1i (s
kn))Nn=1 is a submartingale under σ
∗,ε.
Together with Proposition 3.17 and Eq. (9) we now deduce that the strat-
egy profile σ∗,ε is min-max ε-acceptable.
3.10 The Construction of a Stationary Correlated Min-
Max ε-Acceptable Strategy
We here show how to amend the proof to prove Theorem 2.4. Since in
transient states the play is already stationary, we need to amend the play
only in communicating sets.
Fix then a maximal communicating set of type A and consider the proof
of Proposition 3.17. Using Theorem 3.9 instead of Proposition 3.10 we obtain
a correlated stationary strategy that yields to the players a high payoff.
Fix now a maximal communicating set C of type B and consider the
proof of Proposition 3.20. Plainly there is a correlated stationary strategy z
that ensures that the play visits every state in C infinitely often. One such
profile is choosing at every stage one of the pure stationary strategy profiles
y{s(l)},C with a uniform distribution. We now argue that there is a correlated
stationary strategy τ that satisfies Conclusions (F.1)–(F.3) of Proposition
3.20. Indeed, consider a state s ∈ C. If there is no exit at s with positive
probability, that is, s 6= s(l) for every l, we define τ(s) = z(s). Otherwise, we
define τ(s) to be a convex combination of z(s) and the action profiles a(l) for
which s(l) = s. The weight of each action profile a(l) is determined in such a
way that the probability that the play leaves C through the exit (s(l), a(l)) is
β(l). Details are standard hence omitted.
3.11 Implication of Our Technique to Correlated Equi-
librium
Solan (2001) provides two conditions that ensure that a strategy profile σ
can be transformed into an extensive-form correlated ε-equilibrium. These
conditions are:
(S.1) The limit payoff limλ→0 γ
λ(sn, σhn) exist for every finite history h
n ∈ H .
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(S.2) For every finite history hn ∈ H , every player i ∈ I, and every action
ai ∈ Ai we have
lim
λ→0
γλi (s
n, σhn) ≥ u
∗
i (s
n, σhn,−i, ai)− ε.
The strategy profile σ̂ε constructed by Solan and Vieille (2002) satisfies these
conditions. In our construction, Condition (S.1) is satisfied while Condition
(S.2) is not necessarily satisfied. We now explain how to modify our con-
struction to guarantee that Condition (S.2) is satisfied as well. This ensures
that the simple strategy profiles that we construct can be transformed into
simple extensive-form correlated equilibria.
Whenever sn is a transient state Condition (S.2) holds by the definition
of E. We first slightly modify the definition of a communicating set under
E: In Condition (C.2) in Definition 3.4 we did not impose any condition
on the nature of the strategy profile that leads the play from one state in
C to other states in C. Change then the definition of a communicating set
under E by requiring that this strategy profile must be an ε-perturbation
of E. We also modify the definition of an exit: an exit from a set C is a
tuple (s, x(s), J, aJ) where s is a state in C, x(s) is a mixed action profile
in E(s), J is a subset of players, and aJ ∈ ×i∈JAi is an action profile, such
that the following conditions hold: (a) q(C | s, aJ , x−J(s)) < 1, and (b)
q(C | s, aJ ′, x−J ′(s)) = 1 for every strict subset J
′ of J . The set of exits is
now infinite, and to be able to talk about discrete distributions, we consider
a discretization of this set. The strategy profiles yD(l);C (see the proof of
Proposition 3.11) and y{s(l)};C (see the proof of Proposition 3.20) can be
chosen to be ε-perturbations of E, and the action profile a′ in Lemma 3.19
can be chosen to be a mixed action in E(s), hence Condition (S.2) is satisfied
as well.
3.12 Complexity of Finding a Min-Max ε-Acceptable
Strategy Profile
Our proof allows one to construct a min-max ε-acceptable strategy profile.
However, to do this one needs to be able to calculate the uniform min-max
value of all players in all states. Unfortunately, to date there is no efficient
algorithm for calculating the uniform min-max value in stochastic games,
see, e.g., Condon (1994) Chatterjee et. al (2008)).
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